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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Timothy A. Kellis appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts and course of proceedings
underlying Kellis' convictions as follows:
Kellis was initially charged with ten counts of lewd and
lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 181508, and two counts of sexual abuse of a child, I.C. § 18-1506, for
misconduct with teenage boys, much of which occurred at a Boy
Scout camp where Kellis was a staff member. Subsequently, one of
the ten lewd conduct counts was amended to attempted lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen, I.C. §§ 18-306 and 18-1508.
Kellis pleaded not guilty to all charges and went to trial before a
jury. He was found guilty of all counts. The district court imposed
concurrent unified sentences of life with fifteen years fixed for each
of the nine counts of lewd conduct, fifteen years with five years
fixed for the count of attempted lewd conduct, and twenty-five years
with fifteen years fixed for each of the two counts of sexual abuse.
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 813-814, 229 P.3d 1174, 1175-1176 (Ct. App.
2010).
After the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences

(lg_,_), Kellis filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (R., Vol. I, pp.14-52).
The district court appointed counsel, and later substitute counsel, to represent
Kellis. (R., Vol. I, pp.156-159, 166-167, 186-188.) Through appointed counsel,
Kellis filed an amended and second amended petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., Vol. I, pp.190-197; Vol. II, pp.313-320.)
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Kellis asserted 12 claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and one claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. (R., Vol. II, pp.313-320.)
The state moved for summary dismissal of Kellis' petition, asserting that
Kellis failed to allege facts that would entitle him to relief under the applicable
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) standard as to any of his
claims. (R., Vol. I, pp.198-232. 1 ) The district court granted the state's motion.
(R., Vol. II, pp.425-441.) Kellis timely appealed. (R., Vol. II, pp.442-445.)

1

The state moved to dismiss Kellis' first amended petition for post-conviction
relief. (R., Vol. I, pp.198-232.) Kellis subsequently filed a second amended
petition in which he alleged he was denied effective assistance of counsel as
guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution as well as the United States Constitution.
(See 10/16/12 Tr., R.., Vol. 11, pp. 313-320.) The state did not file an additional
response or motion to dismiss with regard to the second amended petition, but
referred to its previous brief in the hearing on its motion to dismiss the second
amended petition. (10/16/12 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-21.)
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ISSUE
Kellis states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Kellis's petition
without proper notice per I.C. § 19-4906(b)?
(Appellant's brief, p.2)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Kellis failed to show the district court dismissed his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on grounds entirely independent from those set
forth by the state in its motion for summary dismissal?
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ARGUMENT
Kellis Has Failed To Show The District Court Dismissed His Ineffective Assistance
Of Counsel Claims On Grounds Entirely Independent From Those Set Forth By
The State In Its Motion For Summary Dismissal

A.

Introduction
Kellis contends that the district court summarily dismissed four of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims on grounds distinct from those set forth
by the state in its motion for summary dismissal, thus depriving him of required
notice. (See generally Appellant's brief.) However, a review of the record reveals
that the district court dismissed Kellis' claims on substantially similar grounds as
set forth by the state - that Kellis failed to allege facts satisfying the applicable
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Further, even if
the court did dismiss the petition entirely independent grounds, any such error is
harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
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C.

The District Court Dismissed Kellis' Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Claims On Substantially Similar Grounds As Set Forth By The State
The district court may, on a party's motion or its own initiative, summarily

dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-4906; Ridgley v. State, 148
Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (Ct. App. 2010). The procedure for summary
dismissal is equivalent to that for a summary judgment motion under I.R.C.P. 56.
Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675, 227 P.3d at 929 (citation omitted). Thus, dismissal is
appropriate on determination that no "genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file."

kl

Where the district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition on
its own motion, a petitioner is entitled to notice of the basis for the dismissal, and
20 days to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b). If the state moves to dismiss, the motion
serves as notice for which petitioner may respond under I.C. § 19-4906(c). Buss
v. State, 147 Idaho 514,517,211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009). The petitioner is
entitled to a twenty-day period of time to respond to the state's motion. State v.
Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 489, 632 P.2d 676, 678 (1981); Isaak v. State, 132
Idaho 369, 370, 972 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Ct. App.1999).

If the district court

dismisses on grounds other than those articulated in the state's motion, the
petitioner must be given additional notice and an opportunity to respond pursuant
to I.C. § 19-4906(b).

kl

In Kellyv. State, 149 Idaho 517,236 P.3d 1277 (2010), the Idaho Supreme
Court clarified the distinction in post-conviction appeals between a claim of
insufficient notice of the grounds for summary dismissal, and a claim that there
was no notice of the grounds for summary dismissal.
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An appellant may not

challenge the sufficiency of the notice contained in the state's motion for
summary disposition and accompanying memoranda for the first time on appeal.

!s;L at 521-522, 236 P.3d at 1281-1282 (citing DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,
602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009)). An appellant may, however, assert for the first
time on appeal that he did not receive any notice of dismissal, i.e., that the district
court dismissed the petitioner's claims on grounds entirely independent from the
ground he was provided notice of in the state's motion and supporting briefs. !s;L
In Kelly, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to show
the district court dismissed the post-conviction claims on entirely independent
grounds where the state provided the applicable Strickland ineffective assistance
of counsel standard, 2 cited Idaho law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel
claims; and where the district court held that "Kelly has not provided specific facts
to show that [Kelly's attorney's] behavior fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation, and that such a claim was 'unsupported by the
record."' !s;L at 522-524, 236 P.3d at 1282-1284. The Idaho Supreme Court also
held that "[w]hen a trial court summarily dismisses an application for postconviction relief based in part on the arguments presented by the State, this is
sufficient to meet the notice requirements."

!s;L at 523, 236 P.3d at 1283

(emphasis in original, citations omitted)).
In the present case, because Kellis failed to preserve any claim that the
state's motion to dismiss provided insufficient notice of summary dismissal, he

2

Pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), a postconviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
6

must meet the more stringent standard of showing that the district court
dismissed the claims in question on entirely independent grounds than set forth
by the state.

Kellis cannot make such a showing.

The state moved for summary dismissal of Kellis' post-conviction petition
on December 13, 2011. (R., Vol. I, pp.198-233.) Prior to discussing Kellis' claims
individually, the state cited the applicable Strickland standard and cited Idaho law
relating to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (R., Vol. I, pp.203-208.) The
state concluded, "Kellis' claims fail to raise any genuine issues of material fact
regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice." (R., Vol. I, p.221.)
At the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, the state further
summarized, "[i]t's not a key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a
long series of examples how the case might have been tried better." (2/12/13 Tr.,
p.18, Ls.19-22.)
On April 10, 2013, after the submission of additional argument and
evidence (R., Vol. II, pp.325-388, 419-422), the district court summarily
dismissed Kellis' petition.

(R., Vol. II, pp.425-441).

After addressing each of

Kellis' claims individually, the court summarized that Kellis "has not presented
any claims that raise a question of fact as to both prongs of the Strickland test."
(Id.) Kellis thus had notice of the court's grounds for dismissal: that he failed to
allege facts, which if true, would satisfy the Strickland standard.
A review of the individual claims at issue further demonstrates that the
district court dismissed the claims on substantially similar grounds as set forth by
the state. While the district court, in some instances, approached the Strickland
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analysis in different ways than did the state, the court's reasoning for dismissal
was not so distinct as to transform its decision into a sua sponte dismissal that
required additional notice.
1.

Trial Counsel's Failure To Present Evidence That The Victims
Previously Made A Timely Accusation Of Sexual Misconduct
Against The Camp Director

In his first post-conviction claim, Kellis asserted his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence that the victims made
allegations of sexual misconduct against the camp director the previous summer.
(R., Vol. II, pp.314-315.) Such evidence, Kellis argued, "would have had a very

significant effect on the credibility" of the victims. (Id.)

In support of this claim,

Kellis submitted a copy of a letter he claims to have sent the summer before he
was charged, in which he discussed the accusations made by some campers
against the camp director. (R., Vol. 11, pp.314-315, 335-336.)
In moving for summary dismissal of this claim, the state questioned the
authenticity of the letter, and argued that even to the extent the letter and the
assertions contained within were genuine, they did not support Kellis' claim that
his trial counsel's performance was deficient.

(R., Vol.

I, pp.209-210.)

Specifically, the state noted that not all of the victims were mentioned in the letter,
and that the accusations contained within the letter were relatively benign relative
to Kellis' conduct (i.e., that the camp director looked and entered into campers'
tents without permission.) (R., Vol. I, pp.209-210.)
In its order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition, the district court
concluded that Kellis failed to sufficiently allege facts that would satisfy the
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Strickland standard with regard to this claim.

(R., Vol. II, pp.429-430.)

Specifically, the court concluded that Kellis both failed to adequately support the
factual allegations underlying the alleged counsel deficiency, and failed to assert
prejudice.

(Id.)

The district court also pointed out that the prior accusations

made against the camp director were discussed at trial, and were referenced
during Kellis' closing argument. (Id.)
The district court thus dismissed this claim on substantially similar grounds
as set forth by the state. Both the district court and the state characterized the
letter as having minimal exculpatory value. This characterization addresses both
prongs of a Strickland analysis - because the exculpatory value of the letter was
at best, minimal, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to investigate the matter
further; and neither the letter nor further investigation of the accusations would
have resulted in an acquittal. Therefore, Kellis has failed to show that the district
court dismissed this claim on grounds entirely independent of those set forth by
the state.
2.

Trial Counsel's Failure To Obtain The Assistance Of An Expert To
Examine The Conduct Of The Victims

In his third post-conviction claim, Kellis asserted his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to obtain an expert witness to examine the conduct of the
four victims "with respect to their failure to make their allegations until
approximately eight months after the alleged events in light of their having made
similar accusations the prior year." (R., Vol. II, p.316.)

In other words, Kellis

argued his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to retain an
expert to attack the victim's credibility.
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In moving for summary dismissal of this claim, the state argued that Kellis'
allegation was "speculative, bare, conclusory, unsubstantiated by any fact, and
[was] inadequate to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing." (R. Vol. I, p.213.) The
state also argued that Kellis failed to identify how the lack of calling an expert to
examine the behavior of the victims adversely effected his case. (Id.) The state
thus touched upon both prongs of Strickland, in that it asserted that Kellis'
allegations were insufficient to establish trial counsel was deficient, and that he
failed to assert prejudice.
In its order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition, the district court similarly
found that Kellis failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the deficiency prong of
the Strickland test by failing to present evidence that counsel's decision was
based upon "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or some other
objective shortcoming." (R., Vol. II, p.432.)
The district court thus dismissed this claim on substantially similar grounds
as set forth by the state. Both the district court and the state recognized that
Kellis failed to establish a prima facie case with regard to the alleged deficient
performance of his trial counsel.

Therefore, Kellis has failed to show that the

district court dismissed this claim on grounds entirely independent of those set
forth by the state.
3.

Trial Counsel's Failure To Obtain An Expert To Determine Whether
There Was DNA Or Other Physical Evidence On The Property Of
the Victims

In his seventh post-conviction claim, Kellis asserted his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to retain an expert to determine whether there was any
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physical evidence, such as Kellis' DNA, on any of the victims' property, including
their sleeping bags. (R., Vol. 11, p.317.)
In moving for summary dismissal of this claim, the state argued that Kellis'
allegation was "speculative, bare, conclusory, unsubstantiated by any fact, and
[was] inadequate to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing." (R., Vol. I. p.215.) The
state also pointed out that not all of the incidents of Kellis' sexual misconduct
took place in the boys' tents, and there was no testimony or other evidence of
ejaculation. (Id.)
In its order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition, the district court similarly
found that Kellis failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the deficiency prong of
the Strickland test, in that in that he failed to present evidence that counsel's
decision was based upon "any objective shortcoming." (R., Vol. II, pp.434-435.)
The district court also pointed out that a significant amount of time passed
between the sexual misconduct and the filing of criminal charges, which limited
the potential usefulness of scientific testing, since "DNA not appearing the
following April would have had little effect on the trial." (Id.)
The district court thus dismissed this claim on substantially similar grounds
as set forth by the state.

Specifically, both the state and the district court

characterized any potential DNA testing as having limited exculpatory value. This
characterization pertains to both prongs of a Strickland analysis.

Because the

absence of Kellis' DNA in the tents or sleeping bags would have had minimal
exculpatory value, Kellis' trial counsel was not deficient to decline to retain an
expert for the purpose of finding such evidence, and further, Kellis cannot show
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that such evidence would have resulted in an acquittal.

Therefore, Kellis has

failed to show that the district court dismissed this claim on grounds entirely
independent of those set forth by the state.
4.

Trial Counsel's Failure To Call A Witness To Contradict Certain
Testimony, And Failure To Object To That Testimony

In his ninth post-conviction claim, Kellis asserted his trial counsel was
ineffective for: (a) failing to call a particular witness to contradict testimony that
Kellis provided alcohol to one of his victims, and (b) failing to object to such
evidence on relevance grounds. (R., Vol. 11, pp.317-318.)
In moving for summary dismissal of this claim, the state argued that the
evidence that Kellis provided alcohol to one of the victims was relevant to
demonstrate Kellis' grooming behavior. (R., Vol. I, pp.216-217.)

The state also

asserted Kellis failed to demonstrate either deficiency or prejudice with regard to
his trial counsel's failure to object to the victim's testimony about alcohol because
evidence of Kellis' guilt was overwhelming, and because exclusion of the
testimony would not have impacted the outcome of the trial. (Id.)
In its order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition, the court concluded that
Kellis failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the Strickland test with regard to his
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony
contradicting the victim's testimony.

(R., Vol. 11, p.437.) Specifically, the court

found that any evidence that Kellis had not provided alcohol to one of the victims
would have "had very little, if anything, to do with the results of this trial." (Id.)
The district court thus dismissed this claim on substantially similar grounds
as set forth by the state.

On appeal, Kellis contends that the state expressly
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discussed only counsel's failure to object, while the district court expressly
discussed only counsel's failure to present contradictory testimony. (Appellant's
brief, pp.9-10.)

However, while the state focused its argument on counsel's

failure to object, the heading of the relevant section of the motion expressly
refers to Kellis' other sub-claim, that counsel failed to present contradictory
testimony.

(R., Vol. I, p.216.) In any event, the rationale of the state and the

court overlapped to a significant degree. Both the state and the court recognized
that in the grand scheme of the facts adduced at trial, evidence that Kellis
supplied one of the victims with alcohol during a trip, while relevant, had minimal
inculpatory value.

(R., Vol. I, pp.216-217; R., Vol. II, p.437.) Therefore, Kellis

could not show that testimony contradicting that assertion, or even a successful
objection to the testimony, would have resulted in an acquittal.
Kellis has failed to show that the district court summarily dismissed any of
the four challenged claims on grounds entirely independent from those set forth
by the state. He has therefore failed to show that he had no notice regarding the
summarily dismissal of these claims.

D.

Even If The District Court Dismissed the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims on Entirely Independent Grounds, Any Such Error Is Harmless
If a petitioner is "not left with an 'invisible target' and is able to respond in

a meaningful way to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss," then any lack
of adequate notice is harmless.

Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 422-423, 128

P.3d 948, 958-959 (Ct. App. 2005); see also Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664,
671, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Nevertheless, if Franck-Teel's response to
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the state's motion for summary dismissal reveals that she understood the basis
for dismissal. .. , then we will conclude that the inadequacy of notice was harmless
error.").
In this case, to the extent the district court's expressed rationale for
dismissal was so distinct from the grounds set forth by the state as to render the
court's order a sua sponte dismissal, any such error is harmless. Kellis had full
opportunity to present evidence and argument as to how he could satisfy the
deficiency and prejudice prongs of Strickland.

Further, Kellis has not attempted

to describe what type of argument or evidence he would have presented if only
he had more precise notice of the grounds for the district court's dismissal of
these claims.

Finally, Kellis' response to the state's motion for summary

dismissal reveals that he did understand that the basic grounds for the claims'
ultimate dismissal was application of Strickland, as opposed to timeliness, or
waiver, or any other grounds. (See R., Vol. 11, pp.390-416.)
Because Kellis was not left with an "invisible target," and had the
opportunity to respond in a meaningful way to the state's argument that he had
failed to establish a prima facie case regarding the Strickland standard as to any
of his claims, any error regarding required notice of the summary dismissal of
those claims is harmless.

14

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 31st day of March, 2014

I
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of March, 2014, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701

\
MARK W. OLSbN
Deputy Attorney General

MWO/pm

15

